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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b), as amended 2001. This is because the case in the lower court was the
result of an administrative adjudicative proceeding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES.

There are no issues raised on appeal that are not contained in the record of the trial
court below. At the same time, because this appeal is from a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6),
Utah R. Civ. Pro., this Court reviews such a ruling for correctness only and therefore,
Appellants Bio-Thrust, Inc. ("Bio-Thrust") and John Michael Coombs ("Coombs"), a director
and shareholder thereof, believe and submit that no issue asserted on appeal needs to have
been preserved below. See, e.g., DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah
App. 1992).
1.

Whether the trial court erred in not granting Bio-Thrust and Coombs's motion

for partial summary judgment on their First Claim for Relief seeking reinstatement of BioThrust on the ground that the Division of Corporations ("Division") has no evidence that it
complied with the dissolution statute and further, when the Division admittedly failed to follow
the notice and other requirements plainly set out in such statute. Whether the trial court
improperly shifted the burden to Bio-Thrust and Coombs to demonstrate that the Division
complied with the dissolution statute when that is not their duty. Whether the Division can
ignore the law that it is charged with enforcing and implementing when it takes action to
dissolve a Utah corporation. Whether denying Bio-Thrust and Coombs's motion erroneously

ignores the nature of the evidence that must be presented to defeat a summary judgment
motion. Whether the lower court further erred in ignoring and failing to address Bio-Thrust
and Coombs's Motion to Strike the [Opposing] Affidavit of Kathy Berg. R. 208-210.
The applicable standard of review for summary judgment motions denied on the merits,
and a claim or defense of the movant thereby eliminated, is that the facts are viewed in a light
most favorable to the moving party. Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1990). Because a challenge to
summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, the appellate court reviews
those conclusions for correctness, without according any deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether the trial court improperly dismissed Bio-Thrust and Coombs's entire

Petition/Complaint containing the following 19 claims and causes of action: CLAIM ONE:
For an Order Setting Aside the Dissolution of Bio-Thrust; CLAIMS TWO THROUGH FIVE
(inclusive): Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution (Substantive
Due Process); CLAIM SIX: Violation of Article I, § 10 of the Federal Constitution; CLAIM
SEVEN: Violation of Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution (Deprivation of Property without
Due Process of Law); CLAIMS EIGHT THROUGH ELEVEN (inclusive): Violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983; CLAIMS TWELVE AND THIRTEEN: Violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution (Procedural Due Process); CLAIM FOURTEEN AND
FIFTEEN: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; CLAIM SIXTEEN: Violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution (Equal Protection of the Laws); CLAIM
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SEVENTEEN: For a Declaration that the Division's Application of the Dissolution Statute
Violates Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution (Uniform Operation of Laws); CLAIM
EIGHTEEN: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and CLAIM NINETEEN: Equitable Relief in
that "The Law Abhors a Forfeiture." Whether dissolving a publicly held Utah corporation
and thereby rendering that corporation's stock forever worthless as a matter of law constitutes
an unconstitutional "taking without due process of law" inasmuch as the shareholders (i.e.,
the real parties in interest) were never notified of the Division's action nor were any of them
given an opportunity to be heard in that regard, let alone given the ability to correct the
alleged deficiencies. Whether the dissolution statute in effect in 1990 is (or was) reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Whether the dissolution statute violates the
Fourteen Amendment to the federal Constitution. Whether it violates Article I, § 10 of the
federal Constitution. Whether it violates various Utah Constitutional provisions. Whether
Coombs has valid claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whether any of the alleged Utah
Constitutional violations are of "self-executing" provisions, thereby entitling either Bio-Thrust
or Coombs to damages.
In reviewing a judgment entered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
appellate court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and otherwise reviews it under a
correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah
1991); Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App. 1994); Russell v. Standard
Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1996). The appellate court is further obliged to construe the complaint in a light most
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favorable to the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. Heiner v. S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 790P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990); St. Benedict'sDev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
3.

The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision (see Addendum " 1 " hereto), R.

229-233 (entered 8/22/02), declined to declare Bio-Thrust's 1991 dissolution void and a
nullity. It did so on the ground of "unclean hands." See p. 3 of Addendum " 1." Therefore,
a principal issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of unclean hands is applicable to BioThrust's failure to act sooner or, the right or other ability of Bio-Thrust to be judicially
reinstated. If what the trial court really means is that Bio-Thrust is guilty of laches, should
there not have been detrimental reliance on the part of the Division? Does the failure of a
corporation's prior management to file a one-page annual report constitute "unclean hands"
on the part of the corporation and all its shareholders? Further, is Bio-Thrust's alleged
"unclean hands" a legitimate excuse for government's admitted failure to follow and abide by
the dissolution statute? Do two wrongs make a right?
After denying Bio-Thrust's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court went
on to hold that Bio-Thrust and Coombs each lack standing to challenge Bio-Thrust's alleged
unlawful dissolution—and to otherwise assert their remaining 18 claims.1 The result of this

1

This is not to ignore that the Executive Director of the Dept. of Commerce granted
Bio-Thrust and Coombs the right to bring their action in district court under the UAPA (see
Ex. "C" to Addendum "2"), nor is it to ignore that Bio-Thrust and Coombs also filed a
comprehensive Notice of Claim in advance with the Attorney General under the Governmental
Immunity Act, a notice that was never objected to in any regard. See Ex. "4" to Bio-Thrust
and Coombs's Docketing Statement on file with this Court.
-4-

ruling was a dismissal of Bio-Thrust and Coombs's entire Petition/Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. Pro.
The applicable standard of review regarding whether a plaintiff has standing is a
question of law and the appellate court accords no deference to the trial court. Architectural
Committee ofMt. Olympus Cove Subdivision No. 3 v. Kabatznick, 949 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah
App. 1997) (citing Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989)).
Significantly, neither "unclean hands" nor standing were issues addressed or considered by
the Director of the Division or the Executive Director of the Dept. of Commerce and
therefore, the standard of review applicable to upholding an agency's findings is inapplicable.
4.

Had Bio-Thrust and Coombs been able to conduct discovery, they know for a

fact that they would have discovered concrete, documentary evidence that the Division has
been completely arbitrary and capricious in how and under what circumstances it has
historically allowed reinstatement upon the application of a dissolved corporation.
Accordingly, another issue on appeal is whether Bio-Thrust and Coombs have been prejudiced
by not being allowed to conduct discovery on the issue of which corporations over the last 15
years have been allowed to be reinstated (when they have applied for reinstatement past the
statutory deadline) and why.
The applicable standard of review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, with or without
allowing discovery, is a question of law and the appellate court gives the trial court's ruling
no deference and otherwise reviews it under a correctness standard. See standard of review
cases cited above.

-5-

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

The determinative statutes relative to the first set of issues above are the Utah

corporate dissolution statute in effect during 1990, namely, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-88.1
and 16-10-88.2. See Ex. "A" to Addendum "2" hereto, a copy of the statute in issue. The
determinative rule is Rule 56(a), Utah R. Civ. Pro. Determinative cases include Gray v.
Defa, 135 P.2d 251, 256, 1943 Utah LEXIS 111 (Utah 1943) (discussing the breadth of a trial
court's equitable powers); In re: Water Rights ofEscalante Valley Drainage Area, 348 P.2d
679, 682, 1960 Utah LEXIS 135 (Utah 1960) (courts should have the flexibility to fashion
whatever remedy is necessary to achieve justice); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
&HealthReview Comm'n., 430U.S. 442, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d464, 1977 U.S. LEXIS
65 (1977) (an administrative agency must be assigned or delegated the power by the legislature
to do those acts it carries out); Endicott Johnson v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 63 S.Ct. 339, 87
L.Ed. 424, 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1114 (1942) (an administrative agency's actions must be
authorized by the legislature in some fashion); Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12343 (10th Cir. 1991) (a district court has the power and authority
to compel an administrative agency to perform a non-discretionary function); Draughon v.
Department of Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935, 937, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 1999 Utah
App. LEXIS 14 at 5 (Utah App. 1999) ("It is a longstanding principle of administrative law
that an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statute."); IML Freight, Inc. v.
Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296,297 (Utah 1975) (an agency may not "adopt rules or regulations which
abridge, enlarge or modify the statute"); McKnight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 730
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(Utah 1963) (an administrative agency may not. . . take action contrary to or in excess of
statutory law); Crowtherv. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah
App. 1988) (an agency may not take actions in "conflict with the design of an Act, and when
they do, the court has a duty to invalidate them . . .."; accord, Utah DOT v. ROA Gen., 927
P.2d 666, 668 (Utah App. 1996); Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 846
P.2d 1245, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 1992 Utah LEXIS 119 (Utah 1992) (when a rule of law
applies to an agency, an agency's ignoring of such is arbitrary); Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 151 P.2d 467, 1944 Utah LEXIS 128 (Utah 1944) (it is the duty of an administrative
agency to administer the law).
2.

Determinative constitutional provisions relative to the second set of issues above

include the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the
Federal Constitution; further, the Open Courts Provisions, Article I, § 7 (Deprivation of
Property without Due Process of Law) and Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of Laws) of
the Utah Constitution.
To Appellants' knowledge, the only determinative statute relative to the second set of
issues is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The determinative rule is Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. Pro.
The determinative cases include Hafer v. Melo, 116 L.Ed.2d 301, 112 S.Ct. 358
(1991); Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 568 (Utah 1994); Spademan v. Board of Education, 16
P.3d 533 (Utah 2000); Baker v. Angus, Executive Director of the Utah Dept. of Social
Services, 910 P.2d 427,431 (Utah App. 1996); Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996);
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Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388
(N.H. 1988) (damages are an inappropriate remedy for a [state] constitutional violation where
the alleged injury "can be undone" by the judiciary); Capital Gen. Corp. v. Utah Dep't of
Business Regulation, 111 P.2d 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and Cap. Gen. Corp. v. Utah Dep't
of Business Regulation, 837 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (both recognizing that a publicly
held company like Bio-Thrust has intrinsic value by definition); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572
(Utah 1993) (a law does not operate uniformly if persons similarly situated are not treated
similarly or if persons in different circumstances are treated as if their circumstances were the
same); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (voiding
certain legislation because of its retroactive impact); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (1976) (the legislature may overcome the traditional bias against
retroactive statutes as long as it rationally relates the legislation to a legitimate governmental
purpose).
3.

The determinative statute relative to the third set of issues above, namely,

"unclean hands" and standing is § 5(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),
specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(a), titled Judicial review—informal adjudicative
proceeding.
Bio-Thrust and Coombs are not aware of any determinative rule(s).
Other than what Bio-Thrust and Coombs cite in the argument portion of their brief
below out of Am. Jur., there is no determinative "unclean hands" authority known to BioThrust and Coombs and the lower court did not rely on any.
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The determinative case involving standing is Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands
& Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 1986 Utah LEXIS 761 (Utah 1986). However, instead of relying
on Terracor, the trial court instead relied on Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905
P.2d 895, 897 (Utah App. 1995), to rule that Bio-Thrust lacked standing to bring the
Petition/Complaint. Contrary to this authority, in Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491, 492
(Utah 1996), a case the lower court ignored, the Utah Supreme Court held that a suspended
corporation may "engage in business necessary to remedy the corporation's suspended status."
This authority cannot be reconciled with the lower court's standing ruling vis-a-vis Bio-Thrust.
The trial court then proceeded to rely on Stocks v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 3 P.3d 722,
724 (Utah App. 2000), to further rule that Coombs, a principal shareholder and a director of
Bio-Thrust, lacked standing to bring the Petition/Complaint, part of which was on his own
behalf, individually, and part of which was by and in behalf of Bio-Thrust.
4.

Other than the Open Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution, Bio-Thrust and

Coombs do not know which statute, if any, would be determinative of the fourth category of
issues on appeal. The determinative rule is Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. Pro., and the
discovery rules.
The determinative cases would include those cases involving prejudice to a party as a
result of not being allowed to conduct any discovery whatsoever prior to the dismissal of
one's complaint with prejudice. See, e.g., Bingham Truck and Implement Company, v.
Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Utah 1987) (trial court allowed party additional time to conduct
discovery before ruling on other party's motion).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, Judge Livingston presiding, denying Bio-Thrust and Coombs's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relative to their First Claim for Relief (seeking a
declaration that Bio-Thrust was unlawfully dissolved)2 and then granting the Division's Motion
to Dismiss Bio-Thrust and Coombs's "Petition to Set Aside Corporate Dissolution and
Complaint for Declaratory and Other Relief" (hereinafter "Petition/Complaint") in its entirety,
a 19-count de novo action brought in district court for the purpose of seeking reversal of an
adverse administrative adjudicative ruling by the Department of Commerce. Addendum 1;
R.229-233; see also Ex. "C" to Addendum 2, a copy of the Executive Director of the Dept.
of Commerce's Order on Review. Because there is no dispute that the Division failed to
follow the requirements of the dissolution statute when it dissolved Bio-Thrust and because
the lower court considered inadmissible evidence submitted by the Division and used that
evidence to defeat Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Partial Summary Judgment Motion, this appeal
has ensued.

2

In denying Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the
lower court ignored and otherwise failed to address or consider Bio-Thrust and Coombs's
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Kathy Berg, a motion, which, if it has merit, means that the
Division has no evidence with which to resist Bio-Thrust and Coombs's motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. See Addendum 3 hereto, R. 208-210, a copy of such Motion to Strike.
In addition, the Court needs to realize that the Berg Affidavit is attached as Ex. " 1 " to the
Division's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(R. 165-176) and that explains why it does not separately appear in the Trial Court Index. For
the Court's convenience, Bio-Thrust and Coombs have included the Berg Affidavit in
Addendum 3 attached hereto.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Bio-Thrust was incorporated in the State of Utah in 1981. In 1983, Bio-Thrust made
a public offering of its securities in a federal Securities Act of 1933 registration known as an
S-18 in which it raised over $200,000. Today it has some-360 shareholders of record, one
of whom is Appellant Coombs, who owns and controls over 5% of Bio-Thrust's issued and
outstanding shares.
Sometime during 1984, the Company engaged in an acquisition or reorganization
transaction involving medical research with Johns Hopkins University. The project ultimately
failed and according to the books and records of the Division, it failed to file an annual report
with the Division during 1990 as required under the administrative dissolution statute then in
effect. See Ex. "A" to Addendum 2 hereto, a copy of this statute.
Because Bio-Thrust failed to file the 1990 version of a one-page annual report form on
or by August 1, 1990, the Division allegedly sent out a notice on August 14, 1990, declaring
it delinquent as of August 1, 1990. On September 12, 1990, the Division allegedly sent out
notice declaring Bio-Thrust suspended on September 1, 1990. On January 7, 1991, the
Division allegedly sent out notice declaring Bio-Thrust dissolved as of January 1, 1991. See
the [Opposing] Affidavit of Kathy Berg, R. 174-176, also included in Addendum 3 hereto.
The Division's official file contains no evidence that it complied with § 16-10-88.1 of
the dissolution statute when it purported to give notice to Bio-Thrust of such delinquency.
The Division's official file contains no evidence that it complied with § 16-10-88.2
when it purported to give notice to Bio-Thrust of the subsequent suspension.
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The Division's official file contains no evidence that it complied with § 16-10-88.2(4)
when it purported to give notice to Bio-Thrust of the subsequent dissolution.
The Division's official file contains no evidence that it complied with § 16-10-88.2(6)
when it purported to give notice to Bio-Thrust of delinquency, of suspension and of
dissolution, specifically, there is no evidence of or to whom it gave notice to on each of such
three occasions and whether such notices, if given, were given by first class mail, postage
prepaid. There is also no evidence that each such notice contained the requisite notification
and corrective measure enclosures as further required by the statute. See Addendum 4, a copy
of Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Ex. "B" of which
constitutes a full and complete copy of the Division's official Bio-Thrust file.3
On or about June 29, 2001, Coombs, having only recently become a director of BioThrust (see Ex. "A" to Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of Partial Summary Judgment,
Addendum 4, R. 98-144), initiated a Petition with the Division to reinstate Bio-Thrust on the
ground that it had failed to comply with the dissolution statute. The Director of the Division,
in denying the application for reinstatement, produced three (3) computer printouts, none of
which are contained in the Division's "official file." These printouts purport to evidence
compliance with all of the requirements of the dissolution statute. [Emphasis added.] See Ex.
"C" to Addendum 4.

3

That this is NOT the Division's "official file" has never been disputed. The Court
will also note that the three computer printouts subject of this suit and produced by
Defendant/Appellee Berg are NOT contained in such "official file."
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Even if the three computer printouts evidence that notices were indeed sent out (1) of
delinquency, (2) of suspension and (3) of dissolution (an assertion that is not consistent from
the face of the computer printouts themselves), these notices confirm the following: that a full
30 days from the date of the alleged first mailing of a notice of delinquency was NOT given
to correct the alleged delinquency prior to the Division declaring suspended status; they
further evidence that a full 120 days from the date of the alleged second mailing of the notice
of the suspension was NOT given to correct the alleged delinquency prior to the Division
declaring Bio-Thrust dissolved; they further evidence that a full year from the date when BioThrust would have been properly dissolved was NOT given to reinstate Bio-Thrust. All of
this is contrary to the dissolution statute.
In addition to the foregoing, the three computer printouts fail to evidence or otherwise
demonstrate what was specifically included in or enclosed with each such notice, all as
required by the statute.
Bio-Thrust and Coombs appealed the Director's decision denying their application for
reinstatement to the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce. This individual
issued an agency Order on Review affirming the Director of the Division. See Ex. "C" to
Addendum 2, a copy of such Order on Review. Notice was given under the Governmental
Immunity Act and then the judicial action de novo before the trial court below ensued.
Bio-Thrust and Coombs moved the trial court for summary judgment on their First
Claim for Relief for declaration that the dissolution be declared void and a nullity, thereby
reinstating Bio-Thrust.

This motion was supported by an affidavit and three exhibits.
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Addendum 4, R. 98-144. Bio-Thrust and Coombs also moved the lower court to strike the
[Opposing] Affidavit of Kathy Berg. Addendum 3, R. 208-210. The Division cross-moved
for dismissal of the entire 19-count Petition/Complaint on standing and other grounds. The
former motion was denied; the latter motion was granted. Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion
to Strike was ignored. This appeal ensued.
Though the trial court took no evidence, the only factual dispute involves the Division's
contention that all of the proper notices were sent out as required by the dissolution statute.
Bio-Thrust and Coombs strenuously disagree because there is absolutely no evidence of such.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Attached hereto as Ex. "A" to Addendum 2, R. 1-46, is a copy of the dissolution
statute in effect at all times material to this litigation. For the convenience of the Court, a
summary of this statute is as follows:
According to § 16-10-88.1(2) and (3) of the dissolution statute {see Ex. "A" of
Addendum 2 hereto), an alleged notice of delinquency must not only be sent to the corporation
by first class mail, postage prepaid, but it must state the nature of the delinquency and that the
corporation shall be suspended, unless the corporation corrects the delinquency and pays a
notification fee within 30 days of the mailing of the notice of delinquency. The notice must
further state that a suspended corporation may be reinstated only after payment of a
reinstatement fee, The Division is required to include, with the notice of delinquency, any
forms necessary to correct the delinquency.
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According to § 16-10-88.2(2) and (3), an alleged notice of suspension must not only
be sent to the corporation by first class mail, postage prepaid, but the notice must contain the
following disclosures: (a) that the certificate of the corporation has been suspended; (b) the
reason for the suspension; (c) the date of the suspension; (d) that the corporation may remove
the suspension by correcting the delinquency and paying a reinstatement fee determined by the
Division; and (e) that the corporation will be dissolved within 120 days after the date of
mailing of the notice of suspension unless the corporation has removed the suspension before
that time. The Division is further required to physically include or enclose an annual report
form with any notice of suspension.
According to § 16-10-88.2(4), if the corporation does not remove the suspension within
120 days after the date of mailing the notice of suspension, the corporation shall be dissolved
and the Division shall mail a certificate of dissolution to the corporation. It is presumed that
the notice of dissolution must also contain a disclosure, notice or explanation advising the
dissolved corporation and its agents how the corporation could reinstate itself under subsection
(5) of the statute, namely, by applying for reinstatement with the Division within a year of the
date of dissolution.
According to § 16-10-88.2(6), all notices [of delinquency, suspension and dissolution]
must be mailed first-class, postage prepaid, and all notices [of delinquency, suspension and
dissolution] must be addressed separately to the corporation's registered agent and at least one
officer of the corporation who is not the registered agent or to two officers if there is no
registered agent of record.
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A summary of Bio-Thrust and Coombs's argument is this: First, the undisputed
facts demonstrate that the Division did NOT follow the clear and plain requirements of the
dissolution statute when it first suspended and then dissolved Bio-Thrust nor is there one shred
of evidence that it did. Thus, perhaps more than anything, this is an evidence case. Because
Bio-Thrust was not dissolved in conformity with the statute, that is, in a lawful and proper
manner, the lower court erred in not declaring its dissolution void and a nullity
In addition, the alleged computer printouts produced by Director Berg, a person who
has no personal knowledge of these 1991 printouts {see Ex. "C" to Addendum 4, R. 98144)—documents which are NOT in the Division's official file—do not evidence full and
complete compliance with each and all of the requirements of the statute. There being no
admissible evidence to resist Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion for Partial Judgment, the lower
court erred in admitting and considering such inadmissible evidence on a Rule 56 motion.
This is not to ignore that the Division is charged with setting up its administrative
duties correctly and in conformity with the statute. The Division didn't do this and it
acknowledges such. The enabling statute and the Utah Constitution only give the Division
certain powers. The power to re-write the corporate dissolution law is not one of them.
Furthermore, the lower court's blaming Bio-Thrust for the Division's dereliction of duty and
failure to keep the most basic of records essentially shifts the obligation to comply with the
statute to Bio-Thrust when Bio-Thrust has never been charged with enforcing the statute and
it is not a government agency. To make it all Bio-Thrust's fault ignores both the facts and the
statute.
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Second, ignoring the standing issue, if one simply reads the Petition/Complaint straight
through, it is difficult to understand how or why, viewing the document in a light most
generous or favorable to Bio-Thrust and Coombs, its 19 claims and causes of action fail to
state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).
Third, contrary to the lower court's Memorandum Decision, the doctrine of unclean
hands does NOT apply to the facts of this case. The doctrine is inapplicable and irrelevant
because Bio-Thrust and Coombs did NOT harm the Division in any way—something that
application of the doctrine requires. Thus, the lower court erred in relying on this doctrine.
Fourth, with regard to standing, common sense dictates that it is fundamental error to
conclude that a corporation lacks the standing to challenge or contest its own death warrant.
The singular case relied on by the lower court involved a dissolved corporation trying to sue
a third party, long after it was dissolved, for money damages. There is no similarity here.
This is not to ignore that if a dissolved corporation can't have standing to contest or challenge
its own capital punishment, death warrant or unlawful dissolution, Coombs, or a person like
him, becomes a proper person to have standing to do so under Terracor.
Coombs, on the other hand, a shareholder and a director of Bio-Thrust, has standing
because he is suing in the name of and on behalf of the corporation just as one would do if one
were bringing a derivative action under Rule 23.1. Coombs is NOT asserting, individually,
a right belonging to Bio-Thrust. It is only with respect to the § 1983 claims that Coombs is
suing in an individual capacity and he has standing under the plain language of the statute.
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That Coombs's Constitutional rights have been violated "under color of state law" is a direct
injury, giving him individual standing to bring such § 1983 claims.
Fifth, had Bio-Thrust and Coombs been entitled to conduct discovery on the issue of
the multitude of dissolved corporations that have been allowed to be reinstated since at least
1985, evidence would have been uncovered showing that the Division has been arbitrary and
capricious in its administration of the dissolution statute and that numerous corporations have
been allowed to be reinstated under far less severe circumstances than those involving BioThrust. This is unfair. At a minimum, discovery should be allowed on this issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING BIO-THRUST
AND COOMBS A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR ON
THEIR FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
A.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DIVISION COMPLIED WITH THE
DISSOLUTION STATUTE WHEN IT DISSOLVED BIO-THRUST. BIO-THRUST WAS
THUS DISSOLVED ILLEGALLY AND UNLAWFULLY.
If one looks at Exhibit "B" to the Plaintiffs' Affidavit filed below in support of partial
summary judgment, Addendum 4, R. 98-144, namely, the Division's own official file of BioThrust, one sees nothing evidencing compliance with the dissolution statute. For example,
such exhibit contains no evidence of anything after 1989, not to mention the absence of any
evidence of giving any notice, in 1990 or 1991, to Bio-Thrust or its agents (1) of delinquency,
(2) of suspension or (3) of dissolution; nor does such exhibit evidence, by any stretch of the
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imagination, that the statutorily required enclosures and disclosures were in fact contained in
any one of the three required notices.

Since the Division did NOT follow the law and since it cannot possibly be concluded
that Bio-Thrust was properly and lawfully dissolved in accordance with the dissolution statute,
this Court should reverse the lower court and set the dissolution of Bio-Thrust aside or declare
its 1991 dissolution void, a nullity and of no force or effect, an act well within the lower
court's powers.4
The Utah legislature never assigned to the Division the right or other authority to
change or alter the notice and other provisions of the dissolution statute. Yet the Division did

4

A district court of Utah has tremendously general and broad powers and can consider
any judicial matter, issue or question that may exist between the parties. For example, in
Gray v. Defa, 135 P.2d 251, 256, 1943 Utah LEXIS 111 (Utah 1943), Justice Larson, in
discussing the reach of a court's equitable powers, stated:
. . . I think the court under its inherent powers (generally called
equity power) could do, without the Declaratory Judgment Act,
anything it could do under the Act. I think the Act does not, and
indeed cannot, either enlarge or restrict the inherent equitable
powers of the court. The District Courts, as courts of general
and original jurisdiction, have the inherent power to hear, and
fully determine any justiciable issue, any judicial question, that
may arise between parties within the state
In In re: Water Rights ofEscalante Valley Drainage Area, 348 P.2d 679, 682, 1960
Utah LEXIS 135 (Utah 1960), the Utah Supreme Court similarly stated:
The inherent power always exists in a Court of equity for devising new and more
adequate remedies if the facts of the case justify such action, . . . . The equitable jurisdiction
of the court is and should be flexible, elastic enough to meet changing conditions and
problems.
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so regardless. It did so by ignoring the notice provisions of the dissolution statute wholesale,
all as the lower court boldly admits in its Memorandum Decision but brushes off by accusing
Bio-Thrust of "unclean hands." See Addendum 1, R. 229-233.
Alternatively, as set forth in section B immediately below, assuming that the computer
printout forms mean what Director Berg says they mean (something of which she would have
no personal knowledge in any event because she wasn't the Director of the Division in 1990
and 1991), the Division nonetheless blatantly ignored the curing provisions and time periods
plainly set forth in the dissolution statute. Either way, the Division altered or changed the
express provisions of the dissolution statute, conduct that is illegal because it is beyond the
Division's power to do so. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n., 430 U.S. 442, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 65 (1977) (an
administrative agency must be assigned or delegated the power by the legislature to do those
acts it carries out); see also Endicott Johnson v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 63 S.Ct. 339, 87
L.Ed. 424, 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1114 (1942) (an administrative agency's actions must be
authorized by the legislature in some fashion).5
In addition to having broad equitable powers, a district court also has the power and
authority to compel an administrative agency to perform a non-discretionary function.
5

In Archer v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 275 Utah Adv. Rep.
7, 1995 Utah LEXIS 62 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Director
of the Division of State Lands and Forestry because his actions were held to be within his
discretion; they were also held to be in the best interest of the public trust. The same cannot
be said here. Whoever the Director of the Division was in 1990 and 1991, such person did
NOT dissolve Bio-Thrust in a manner within his or her discretion, nor can it possibly be said
that the means and manner by which Bio-Thrust was suspended and then dissolved was "in
the best interest of the public trust." Id
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Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12343 (10th Cir. 1991)
The proper and lawful administrative dissolution of Bio-Thrust or any other Utah corporation
is a non-discretionary function. That is to say, once certain things are not met, like the failure
of a corporation to file an annual report, the dissolution process should commence almost
automatically and in the perfunctory way proscribed by statute—assuming, of course, that the
government agency charged with carrying out such task fulfills its duties and sets things up
properly to accomplish it. Accordingly, this Court should declare the unlawful and illegal
suspension and dissolution of Bio-Thrust void and a nullity and order the Division to recommence such non-discretionary dissolution procedures in a proper and lawful fashion.
The foregoing discussion is not to ignore that a district court can also grant
extraordinary relief if an administrative agency fails to perform an act required by law as a
duty of its office. State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 1995 Utah LEXIS
22 (Utah 1995); see also Rule 65B, Utah R. Civ. Pro. Here, the duty of the Division is to
dissolve corporations properly, lawfully and legally.

Yet the Division did not.6

The

Division's actions also violated the separation of powers doctrine simply because its acts in
derogation of the plain and simple requirements of the statute are tantamount to a legislative,
not executive, function. This is but another ground to set the Division's unlawful suspension
and dissolution aside.
B.
THE THREE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS
COMPLIANCE WITH THE DISSOLUTION STATUTE.
6

DO

NOT

EVIDENCE

Though Bio-Thrust and Coombs have not sought extraordinary relief under Rule 65B,
Utah R. Civ. Pro., that is, an order seeking to command the Division to re-commence the
dissolution of Bio-Thrust in a proper and lawful manner, they certainly could have.
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In Draughon v. Department of Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935, 937, 363 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 14 at 5 (Utah App. 1999), the Utah Court of Appeals,
quoting a long line of other authorities, held:
It is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an
agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statute
(citing several authorities). We adhere to this principle because
"an administrative rule out of harmony or in conflict with the
express provisions of a statute "would in effect amend that
statute." Id. (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Division of
State Lands & Forestry, 888 P.2d 514, 532 (Utah 1994) (Bench,
J., concurring and dissenting)) (additional citations omitted).
In IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme
Court held that an agency may not "adopt rules or regulations which abridge, enlarge or
modify the statute"; see also McKnight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 1963)
(holding that an administrative agency may not . . . take action contrary to or in excess of
statutory law). In Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 762 P.2d 1119 (Utah App.
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals held that an agency may not take actions in "conflict with
the design of an Act, and when they do, the court has a duty to invalidate them . . .." Id. at
1122; accord, Utah DOT v. ROA Gen., 927 P.2d 666, 668 (Utah App. 1996) (citing and
quoting the foregoing authorities with approval).
If the three computer printouts mean what Director Berg says they mean, it remains
undisputed that the Division unilaterally changed, altered and amended the curing and notice
provisions unambiguously set forth in the dissolution statute. These acts amended the
dissolution statute, acts that the Division is not authorized or empowered to do. Id. This
Court thus has a duty to reverse the lower court and invalidate such acts. Crowther, supra.
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It is also unlawful and improper for an administrative agency to undertake a function
or rule of law as delegated to it by statute (i.e., the procedure for suspending and then
dissolving a corporation) and carry out that specific delegated duty in a haphazard, arbitrary,
half-hearted, capricious or sloppy manner. Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 1992 Utah LEXIS 119 (Utah 1992) (when a rule
of law applies to an agency, an agency's ignoring of such is arbitrary); Utah Hotel Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 151 P.2d 467, 1944 Utah LEXIS 128 (Utah 1944) (it is the duty of an
administrative agency to administer the law). Because the computer printouts relied upon by
the Division to claim compliance with the statute evidence only arbitrary and capricious
conduct, this Court should reverse the lower court and declare the suspension and dissolution
of Bio-Thrust illegal, void and a nullity.
The three computer printouts do NOT evidence full and complete compliance with the
dissolution statute. The above-authority demonstrates that the Division exceeded its authority
in unilaterally and admittedly changing both the notice and curing provisions. As a result, this
Court should reverse the lower court's ruling denying Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING,
UNDER RULE 12(b)(6), ALL 19 CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF
ACTION CONTAINED IN THE PETITION/COMPLAINT
The following arguments go to the merits of Bio-Thrust and Coombs's
Petition/Complaint which the lower court erroneously ignored.

-23-

A.
THE DISSOLUTION STATUTE PLAINLY VIOLATES THE SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
Bio-Thrust and Coombs allege in their Petition/Complaint that the Division and Berg's
predecessor should have given notice to the shareholders that Bio-Thrust would be dissolved
and that their shareholder interests would be rendered worthless if the delinquency wasn't
corrected. The Division and Berg countered below that the dissolution statute doesn't require
this. But that is not the point! It is the statute's failure to provide such notice and an
opportunity to be heard (i.e., due process) and the Division's concerted failure to give such
notice, knowing that citizens' property rights are involved, that constitutes the alleged
Constitutional violation.
The Division and Berg next argued below that property rights are rights conferred by
state law and not the Constitution and thus, by implication, the state apparently has the right
to take them away. However, once a person has been given certain property rights, the
Constitution governs the way the state may take away or restrict those rights. Certainly, the
Division and Berg are not arguing that because the State allows you to buy a home, that the
State can take that home away from you without notice or an opportunity to be heard simply
because the mortgage company fails to file a one-page report with some government agency
like Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. It is one thing for a State to create property rights; it is
quite another for the State to take them away without adhering to the requirements of state and
federal Constitutions.7
7

The Division and Berg also contended below that they were unable to locate any case
in any jurisdiction requiring a state Division of Corporations to give notice to shareholders
-24-

B.
THE DISSOLUTION STATUTE IN ISSUE, INCLUDING THE WAY IT HAS
BEEN ADMINISTERED BY THE DIVISION, IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO A
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST.
Permanently dissolving a publicly held corporation and rendering its stock forever
worthless because a past director or officer failed to file a one-page report or formality with
the Division is regulatory overkill, pure and simple. This draconian remedy cannot possibly
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. To understand why, one need only
look at the governmental interest. The Division and Berg argue below that government has
an interest in "policing corporations," creatures of state law, to ensure compliance with and
non-abuse of fundamentals of corporate existence.

Okay.

So how does permanently

dissolving a publicly held corporation and punishing its shareholders further a policing policy?
What policing policy is involved here? What harm is the Division protecting us all against in
order to impose such a drastic measure? The answer is that there is none because the one-page
report is not a fundamental corporate act that needs policing. If the failure to file the form
involved or caused a fraud, one could understand why. But the Division doesn't argue that
Bio-Thrust's alleged failure to file an annual report somehow perpetrated a fraud or other
illegality on anyone, something that would surely be within the Division's police power. As
further evidence that the filing of the report is irrelevant to a policing power, what does the
Division do with the one-page annual report when it gets it? The answer: Nothing other than
catalogue it and use it to identify who the corporation's officers and directors have been for

before administratively dissolving a corporation. While this may be true, it is probably
because no one has bothered to challenge such a statute. This case may thus be a case of first
impression.
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the last year. In fact, even if the information on the form is unchanged from a prior year, a
corporation is still required to file the form. So the question is: Why permanently dissolve
a corporation because a one-page form that isn't any different than the one filed the year
before doesn't get filed on time?
Contrary to the notion that a suspended or dissolved publicly held corporation has no
value and that the Division is taking nothing away from a shareholder by dissolving it, Utah
case law implicitly recognizes that publicly held companies like Bio-Thrust have intrinsic value
by definition. See, e.g,, Capital Gen, Corp, v. Utah Dep't of Business Regulation, 777 P.2d
494 (UtahCt. App. 1989); Cap, Gen, Corp, v. Utah Dep't of Business Regulation, 837P.2d
568 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In sum, permanently dissolving a corporation, particularly corporations that have value
as a publicly held entity, is NOT rationally related to the government's interest in receiving
the one-page annual report containing very little information and in the large majority of cases,
no new information at all.
C.
THE POST-1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE UTAH CORPORATIONS CODE,
WHICH ALLOWED FOR PERMANENT DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION FOR
THE MERE FAILURE TO FILE AN ANNUAL REPORT, DID SUBSTANTIALLY
IMPAIR THE BIO-THRUST'S CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH ITS
SHAREHOLDERS.
Such statute is therefore unconstitutional. The Division and Berg argued below that
Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Fifth and Sixth Claims for Relief should be dismissed (claims
alleging a violation of Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution, namely, the Contracts Clause) because
"[t]he prohibition against Ex Post Facto legislation does not apply to civil legislation."
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Division's memo below at p. 11; R. 62-94. Bio-Thrust and Coombs's research is contrary
to this contention. In the Hornbook titled Constitutional Law by Norwak, Rotunda and
Young, American Casebook Series, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. (1977), pp. 419437, virtually an entire chapter is devoted to prohibitions against retroactive civil legislation.8
To paraphrase the above authority, the U.S. Supreme Court has, albeit infrequently,
relied on the Contracts Clause as a reason to invalidate state legislation that retroactively
affected contractual rights or obligations. The Supreme Court has used the Contracts Clause
to restrict the ability of states to modify or alter public charters and contracts as well as private
contracts. If third parties have accrued rights under a charter or public contract, the state may
be unable to alter the contract. Id., starting at p. 419. Perhaps the question to be asked here
is: Does the dissolution statute impair and conflict with the State's contractual obligations
with validly existing Utah corporations? Id. at p. 427. Bio-Thrust and Coombs believe that
the State of Utah should have required that the dissolution law be put in corporations' Articles
of Incorporation—that way, the drastic and draconian dissolution measures in issue—results
that are extreme in comparison to the defect causing such—would have been disclosed to, and
known by, shareholders. But they weren't.
In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935), the U.S.
Supreme Court voided certain legislation because of its retroactive impact; the legislation was
held a naked appropriation of private property upon the basis of transactions which the owners
8

Pp. 419-428 discuss the Contracts Clause; pp. 428-434 discuss due process limitations
as a result thereof (hence Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Fifth Claim for Relief); and pp. 434-437
discuss ex post facto clauses and bills of attainder. The Division and Berg's "criminal"
applicability argument relates to this latter section.
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of the property were never connected. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
96 S.Ct. 2882 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court, in not overruling Alton Railroad, narrowed
its impact, and suggested that the legislature may overcome the traditional bias against
retroactive statutes as long as it rationally relates the legislation to a legitimate governmental
purpose. Hornbook cited supra at p. 433; see also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571
(1934) (repeal of law violated due process).
There are alternative measures available to promote the State's goals in regulating
corporations other than permanent dissolution of publicly held corporations and therefore the
dissolution statute is unreasonable, irrational and unnecessary. Hornbook cited supra at p.
427-428. In short, the Division cannot show that permanently dissolving Bio-Thrust as a
result of an individual's failure to file a one-page report rationally relates to a legitimate
governmental purpose. This is not to ignore that the permanent dissolution of Bio-Thrust is
also unconstitutional because it has impaired Bio-Thrust's contractual obligations with its
shareholders without promoting an overriding police power interest. Id.
Finally, the Division argues that the dissolution of a corporation for failure to file an
annual report has been the law of Utah since 1972 and was thus in effect in 1981 when BioThrust was incoiporated. Accordingly, so the argument goes, there would have been no
retroactive legislation impairing Bio-Thrust's contractual obligations with its shareholders after
it was incorporated or after it did its public offering on federal securities registration Form
S-18. While the fact that a Utah corporation could be dissolved for failure to file an annual
report appears to have been the law since 1972 {see Division's memo below, p. 12 citing
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UBCA § 16-10-89), the fact is that between 1972 and 1985, it was easy and perfunctory to
reinstate a corporation and to Bio-Thrust and Coombs's knowledge and belief, there was no
time limit to do so, either administratively or judicially. Bio-Thrust and Coombs's research
reveals that the provision of the statute whereby a corporation would be permanently dissolved
and could not be administratively reinstated was passed for the first time effective July 1,
1985. In that statute, specifically, § 16-10-88.5(7), a corporation dissolved for failure to file
an annual report had but three years to reinstate itself upon application to the Division and
payment of all past due taxes, penalties and reinstatement fees. Because the 1985 amendment
significantly altered Bio-Thrust's contractual obligations with its stockholders and there is no
legitimate governmental reason or purpose to have been achieved in doing so (other than the
secret goal of eliminating "shell corporations"), such legislation violates Art. 1, § 10 of the
Constitution. As a result, Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Fifth and Sixth Claims for Relief each
state a claim.
D.
A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTS NOT ONLY TO CLAIM A
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION (I.E., THE
STATE'S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE), BUT ALSO TO SEEK AND OBTAIN DAMAGES.
The Division and Berg argue that Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Seventh Cause of Action
alleging a violation of Article 1, § 7 of the Utah Constitution fails to state a claim because it
is the equivalent of a due process claim under the 14th Amendment to the federal Constitution
and, so the argument goes, Bio-Thrust and Coombs's make no valid claim for a violation of
the 14th Amendment.
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While the Division may be correct with respect to the general consistency between
federal and state law, their argument is undercut by Spackman v. Board of Education of Box
Elder County School District, 16 P.2d 533 (Utah 2000). In Spackman at 535-536, the Utah
Supreme Court held that Utah Const. Art. I, § 7, the state due process clause, is "selfexecuting." This means that, on its face, Art. I, § 7 prohibits certain governmental conduct
and does not require any enabling legislation. Id. In Spackman, the Supreme Court further
held that monetary damages can be awarded for the violation of a self-executing clause. Id.
at 537-538. This holding underscores a substantial difference between state due process law
and federal due process law. That is to say, Bio-Thrust and Coombs are not aware that they
can sue the federal government or the State of Utah outright for a violation of the 14th
Amendment and collect money damages. Moreover, Spackman articulates a three-part test
to determine whether a person's state constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at p. 538.
Bio-Thrust and Coombs's research does not reveal that this same three-part test is the law with
respect to violations of the 14th Amendment to the federal Constitution.
Based on the foregoing, Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Seventh Claim for Relief in their
Petition/Complaint states a claim.
E.
INJURY IS NOT A STANDING ISSUE UNDER THE DISSOLUTION
STATUTE AND THEREFORE WHETHER THE DIVISION'S ADMITTED FAILURES TO
FOLLOW THE LAW IN DISSOLVING BIO-THRUST VISITED INJURY UPON BIOTHRUST OR ITS SHAREHOLDERS IS IRRELEVANT.
The Division and Berg argue that the Division's admitted failures to give proper notice
under the dissolution statute visited or imposed no harm upon the Bio-Thrust or Coombs (or
apparently any Bio-Thrust shareholder) because no showing has been made by Bio-Thrust and
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Coombs that an application for reinstatement was made, or would have been made, during the
periods when the Division admittedly "jumped the gun" and ignored the time periods in the
statute. Division memo below, pp. 13-14; R. 62-94.9
That anyone made or didn't make an effort to reinstate Bio-Thrust during an incorrect
suspension or dissolution period is not an issue, and has not been alleged, in this litigation;
nor is damage or injury a specific issue under the dissolution statute. The issue is that the
Division blatantly violated and ignored the plain and simple notice instructions contained in
the dissolution statute that are required to lawfully dissolve a corporation and that it has no
excuse for such failures. This is not to ignore that the issue from a Constitutional standpoint
also involves the notion of "chilling effect." Could the Division's violation of the law have
had a "chilling effect" on anyone interested in taking action to reinstate Bio-Thrust? The
answer is an obvious "Yes."
The Division and Berg also argue below that ". . .an agency's failure to follow its
internal rules, or even state statutory requirements, does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation (citing authorities)." Division's memo below, p. 14; R. 62-94. Yet Bio-Thrust and
Coombs do not believe that their Petition/Complaint alleges that the Division's failure to
follow or abide by the dissolution statute, in and of itself and without anything more, resulted
in the Constitutional violations or deprivations complained of. This argument is therefore
irrelevant.

9

It is unclear to Bio-Thrust and Coombs whether this argument relates to any particular
claim for relief or is a general argument concerning what is necessary to make out a
Constitutional violation.
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The Division and Berg also argued below that "Bio-Thrust was given notice and given
the opportunity to be heard and to correct its delinquency. It failed to do so." These
statements are belied by the fact that the Division has no documentary evidence in its official
Bio-Thrust file that it gave any notice to anyone about delinquency, suspension or dissolution.
The last thing in its "official file" is dated in 1989, a year before the declared delinquency and
nearly 2 years before the declared dissolution. See the Division's "official file," Ex. "B" to
Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Addendum 4;
R. 98-144.
F.
THE COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGES THAT THE DISSOLUTION
STATUTE VIOLATES BOTH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AND THE COROLLARY PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
In Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Sixteenth Claim they allege a violation of Section 1 of the
14th Amendment requiring equal protection of the laws; in their Seventeenth Claim, they
allege the state constitutional counterpart thereto, namely, a violation of Art. 1, § 24, Ut.
Const. In these claims, Bio-Thrust and Coombs contend that the dissolution statute creates
two disparate classifications of shareholders, those who own stock in corporations that are in
good standing and those who own stock in corporations that are not—and that these
classifications are unfair and discriminatory as regards their ultimate impact on shareholders.
In addition, the dissolution statute has put publicly held companies in the same boat as closely
held corporations. This too is discriminatory and unfair, particularly when publicly held
companies have intrinsic value and closely held corporations do not. The Division and Berg
argue here that a classification can only be struck down if the classification is not rationally
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related to a legitimate state or governmental interest; further, that in this case, the
classification of is neither irrational nor discriminatory. Division's memo below, p. 15; R.
62-94.
In Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), a Utah equal protection/uniform operation
of laws case, the Utah Supreme Court, in discussing Utah Const., Art. 1, § 24, held that a law
does not operate uniformly if persons similarly situated are not treated similarly or if persons
in different circumstances are treated as if their circumstances were the same. Here, we have
Utah resident shareholders of corporations, many of which may be virtually identical in
corporate structure, assets, number of shareholders, etc., and yet because a person connected
to one of such corporations fails to file a one-page report with the Division, everyone's stock
in that corporation is permanently rendered valueless.

Thus, shareholders in identical

situations are not treated the same.
A variant of this also true and has been specifically alleged in Bio-Thrust and Coombs's
Petition/Complaint. Bio-Thrust and Coombs have alleged that some corporations that have
been dissolved have been later easily reinstated by the Division and others, like Bio-Thrust,
have not—and without any particular rhyme or reason. Put another way, with regard to
reinstatement, corporations and their shareholders, all of whom are similarly or identically
situated, are not, and have not been, treated equally or similarly. Bio-Thrust and Coombs
have alleged in their Petition/Complaint that these acts have been unreasonable, capricious and
arbitrary and that there is no reason why this is so. As stated in Lee v. Gaufin, supra, equal
protection protects against discrimination within a class. But there are many such instances
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and Bio-Thrust and Coombs are entitled to know why. The fact is that no legitimate
explanation exists as to why the reinstatement of dissolved corporations has not been applied
evenhandedly over the years.
Finally, with regard to the Lee v. Gaufin test above, the converse of the above two
examples exists: shareholders of publicly held corporations, persons who are in different
circumstances and who own a different asset (and who may have paid a lot more more for it)
than shareholders of closely held corporations, are treated the same under the dissolution
statute. This too makes no sense and is unfair and discriminatory. Under Lee v. Gaufin,
supra, a rational-basis, or the least restrictive standard, applies to determine if the statutory
classification is constitutional.

Based on the foregoing three examples of "unequal

protection," the dissolution statute in issue should be declared unconstitutional and invalid.
G.
THE PETITION/COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGES VIOLATIONS
OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Division's second argument is that Bio-Thrust and Coombs are barred from
making a damage claim against the State of Utah, the Division of Corporations or the
Department of Commerce. While this may be true, it is again irrelevant. This is because BioThrust and Coombs have not asserted a damage claim against such entities. The only claim
for damages is by Coombs and such claims are against individual employees and agents of the
Division. See the plain language of Coombs's § 1983 causes of action and the Prayer for
Relief relative to such claims.
The Division also argues that under federal law, a claim against Division Director Berg
in her official capacity is a claim against the Division and thus a claim against the State of
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Utah and therefore similarly barred. Division's memo below, p. 5 (citing Monell v. New York
City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and other authorities).10 The Division and Berg, however,
misperceive Coombs's claim against Berg. Coombs's claims against Berg and the John and
Jane Doe Defendants are in their "individual capacities." In Hafer v. Melo, 116 L.Ed.2d 301,
112 S.Ct. 358 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "state officials, sued in their
individual capacities, are 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983." Id. at 359; accord, Brown
v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 568 (Utah 1994) (citing Hafer v. Melo with approval).11 There is thus
nothing wrong or improper about Coombs asserting a § 1983 damage claim against individual
agents and employees of the Division, including Division Director Kathy Berg.
It also appears from Spackman v. Board of Education, 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000), that
Coombs could amend his Petition/Complaint and assert damage claims on account of the
several alleged violations of the Utah Constitution (at least to the extent that the claimed
violations are of "self-executing" state Constitutional provisions).

The present

Petition/Complaint only contemplates or seeks damages on account of alleged violations of
10

The Division and Berg appear careful to emphasize federal law in this argument as
opposed to state law because the liability for state Constitutional violations is broader and,
from what Coombs can discern, does allow for damage claims against the State of Utah and
its agents. See, e.g., Spackman v. Board of Education, 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000) (holding that
violations of "self-executing" state constitutional provisions such as the state due process
clause (Utah Const. Art. I, § 7) and the takings clause (Utah Const. Art. I, § 22) allow a
plaintiff to maintain a damages claim). Bio-Thrust and Coombs have alleged a violation of
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7, though it is not presently framed as a claim for damages. See BioThrust and Coombs's Seventh Claim for Relief.
11

In Baker v. Angus, Executive Director of the UtahDept. of Social Services, 910P.2d
427, 431 (Utah App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals held, in the context of § 1983, that
supervisory liability attaches when officials, among other things, "create policies and practices
pursuant to which the constitutional deprivation was carried out." Such is the case here.
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§ 1983. At the same time, Coombs's research also reveals that if reinstatement of Bio-Thrust
is in fact an available remedy (i.e., Bio-Thrust and Coombs's First Claim for Relief), Coombs
would be barred from suing for damages for a violation of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 539
(discussing the third element required in order to proceed with a private damages action and
citing Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass % Inc. v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d 1385,
1388 (N.H. 1988) (stating that damages are an inappropriate remedy for a [state] constitutional
violation where the alleged injury "can be undone" by the judiciary)). Policy considerations,
including the prospect or potential of turning this case into a damages claim against the
Division and the State of Utah, therefore justify the Court overruling the lower court and
granting the Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The Division and Berg also argued below that, with respect to the § 1983 claims of
Coombs, Coombs has not shown a link between each [individual] defendant and the
Constitutional violations alleged. Division's memo below, pp. 5-6; R. 62-94. Coombs agrees
that this is the law. His answer is that a link exists by virtue of each such alleged individual
defendant's status.

Berg, in August 2001, had the opportunity to undo or fix the

Constitutional violations but, knowing what they were, she refused to do so. Her predecessors
(whoever discovery would have revealed that they were) implemented and carried out the
Constitutional violations back in 1990 and 1991 because no one else could have done it.
Surely, the Division and Berg aren't arguing that the wrongful and unlawful dissolution of
Bio-Thrust and the failure to give notice to its shareholders that their property would be
rendered worthless was done by imposters, by someone else other than the Division and its
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agents and employees! Because any required "link" is presumed by the status and authority
of those necessarily involved, no specific "link" between them and the Constitutional
violations need be shown.
H.
BERG AND THE JOHN AND JANE DOE DEFENDANTS BELOW WHO
VIOLATED COOMBS'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND THE RIGHTS OF OTHER
SHAREHOLDERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY BECAUSE PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE "CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
RIGHTS."
The Division and Berg also argued that government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity because "clearly established rights are not implicated in their actions." Division's
memo below, pp. 6-7; R. 62-94. While this may be the law, it does not apply to the facts of
this case.
A government official is qualifiedly immune from liability if the conduct alleged in the
complaint did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 568 (Utah 1994)
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982)). Given that this country was founded on the concept of personal property rights, it
is difficult to believe, let alone understand, that governmental action that renders someone's
personal property permanently worthless as a matter of law—without notice or an opportunity
to be heard—is NOT a violation of "clearly established rights." Accordingly, none of the
government official defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity.12
12

It is noteworthy that in Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah 1994), a thrift institution
sued the Department of Financial Institutions of Utah and its Commissioner, alleging that its
due process rights were violated (in further violation of § 1983) when the Department took
control of it and seized its assets. The district court dismissed the action and the plaintiff/thrift
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN USING THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCLEAN HANDS AS A BASIS TO DENY PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO BIO-THRUST AND COOMBS AND IN FURTHER
RULING THAT BIO-THRUST AND COOMBS LACKED STANDING
A.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS IS INAPPLICABLE.

The lower court denied Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the basis of the doctrine of unclean hands. This is apparently because Bio-Thrust
failed to petition the Division and the Department of Commerce sooner to reinstate itself or,
because its then-management, 10 years ago, failed to file a one page annual report. Thus, so
the lower court has held, Bio-Thrust and its 360 shareholders have come to court with
"unclean hands." This application of the doctrine misperceives it. In 27A Am. Jur. 2d,
"Clean-Hands" Maxim, § 136, Effect of wrongful conduct which does not injure, or is
beneficial to, defendant, p. 614, it says:
As a general rule, the doctrine of unclean hands is applicable
only where the party seeking to invoke it was injured, damaged,
or prejudiced by the alleged wrongful conduct (citing Sandusky
v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 Ark. 465, 773 SW2d 95; Midwest
Management Corp. v. Stephens (Iowa) 353 NW2d 76;
Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex 367, 341 SW2d 401, 13 OGR
654, rehg of cause overr (Dec. 31, I960)). If the alleged
wrongful conduct of the complainant appears not to have injured,
damaged, or prejudiced the defendant, the maxim may not be

institution appealed. In affirming the lower court on the due process violation claim, the Utah
Supreme Court noted that "Plaintiffs do not allege that the Commissioner failed to follow the
provisions of the applicable statute or that the statute itself is unconstitutional." Id. at p. 566.
Such is not the case here. Not only did the Division and its agents and employees fail "to
follow the provisions of the applicable [dissolution] statute," Bio-Thrust and Coombs here
allege that the dissolution statute is unconstitutional on a number of grounds. These facts
distinguish the case at bar from Brown v. Weis.
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successfully invoked (citing Calloway v. Partners Nat'I Health
Plans (CA-11 Ala) 986 F2d 446; Taylor v. Taylor, 150 Colo.
304, 372 P.2d 449; Feldman v. Feldman, 358 Mich. 311, 100
NW2d 211; Price v. Ridler , (Mo) 373 SW2d 59; Kostelnik v.
Roberts, (Tex App Corpus Christi) 680 SW2d 532 (1985)).
No argument can be made that the Division is in any way "injured, damaged, or
prejudiced" by Bio-Thrust or its past management's failure to take action to reinstate the
corporation sooner. Accordingly, based on the application of the doctrine quoted above, "the
maxim may not be successfully invoked." This principle is similar to the idea that to
successfully invoke a laches defense, there must be some sort of detrimental reliance or
disadvantage. See, e.g., Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 769, 773, 1951 Utah LEXIS 195
(Utah 1951), in which the Utah Supreme Court held that "[t]he equitable doctrine of laches
is founded upon considerations of time and injury. 'Laches in legal significance is not mere
delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another (citing Pomeroy 's Equity Jurisprudence,
4th Ed. § 1442).'" In this case, neither the lower court nor the Division has identified any
detrimental reliance, injury or disadvantage that has been visited upon the Division or Director
Berg by any act of Bio-Thrust or Coombs.
Because the lower court's application of the unclean hands doctrine is plainly wrong,
this Court should reverse the lower court's denial of Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, directing it to grant the same.
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B.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THAT BIOTHRUST AND COOMBS BOTH LACK STANDING.
The lower court's standing ruling in its Memorandum Decision {see Addendum 1)
ignores the leading case in Utah on standing, namely, Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands
& Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 1986 Utah LEXIS 761 (Utah 1986). Such ruling also cannot be
reconciled or squared with Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491, 492 (Utah 1996).
In Terracor, the Utah Supreme Court set forth three (3) separate and alternative tests
for standing.13 These are: (1) whether the plaintiff has suffered some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute; (2) whether no one
else (other than the plaintiff) has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the issues
are unlikely to be raised unless that particular plaintiff is given standing to raise the issue; or
(3) whether the issues are of such great public importance that they ought to be decided in
furtherance of the public interest. Id. at 799.
It is difficult to believe, let alone understand how or why a corporation, one of its
directors, or even one of its major shareholders, would NOT have standing under any one of
Terracor's three tests to challenge a corporation's very right to exist or, conversely, its illegal
and unlawful suspension and dissolution by the government. It is also difficult to understand
how a person whose personal property has been rendered worthless by the alleged unlawful
acts of government (acts of which he or she had no notice or an opportunity to be heard)
would not have standing to so complain or seek redress in a court of law. Finally, it is
13

The Utah Supreme Court also added a fourth standing test, for a taxpayer, if the
issues in the case involve a challenge to an alleged illegal expenditure by government. This
is not at issue here. Id. at p. 799, note 4.
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difficult to understand why, when possibly thousands of Utah corporations have been dissolved
since 1985, thereby conceivably affecting hundreds of thousands of Utah resident
shareholders, the issues presented in this appeal are not of "such great public importance that
they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public interest." Id. at 799.
In ignoring Terracor, the trial court erroneously relied on Holman v. Callister, Duncan
& Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895, 897 (Utah App. 1995). In Holman, this Court held that certain
statutes (inapplicable here) did not allow a dissolved corporation to pursue legal malpractice
claims against a law firm after the corporation had ceased to exist as a corporate entity. This
is nothing like the case at bar; here, a corporation merely seeks to challenge those procedures
and actions which dissolved it in the first place. Furthermore, contrary to Holman, in Murphy
v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491, 492 (Utah 1996), a case the lower court also ignored, the Utah
Supreme Court held that a suspended corporation may "engage in business necessary to
remedy the corporation's suspended status." No authority could be more on point. This is
precisely what Coombs and Bio-Thrust have been trying to do.
Contrary to the lower court's ruling, § 16-10-88.2(4) of the dissolution statute only
provides that dissolution precludes a corporation from doing business in its corporate character
under any name or any assumed name.14 Suing to resurrect and re-legitimize oneself in the
14

The fiill text of this provision of the dissolution statute is as follows:
The dissolution of any corporation precludes that corporation
from doing business in its corporate character under any name or
assumed name filed on behalf of the dissolved corporation under
Section 42-2-5. On the date of dissolution, the corporation's
right in any assumed names it may use is suspended. The name
of the dissolved corporation and any assumed names filed on its
-41-

eyes of the law is neither "doing business" in a corporation's "corporate character" nor is it
a "winding up" of the corporation's affairs. Murphy v. Crosland, supra at 492. Such would
beg the very question in issue in this appeal.
Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker is not the least similar to the case at bar.
Holman does not involve a corporation's efforts to re-establish the validity of its own existence
or, conversely, to challenge the lawfulness of its own death warrant and dissolution. An
additional dissimilarity to Holman is the fact that the Bio-Thrust is NOT a plaintiff to any
claim seeking money damages.
In ruling that Coombs, a principal shareholder and a director of Bio-Thrust, also lacks
standing to bring the Petition/Complaint, the trial court also erred. On this issue, the lower
court erroneously relied on Stocks v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 3 P.3d 722, 724 (Utah
App. 2000).

See p. 2 of Addendum 1.

Stocks is distinguishable.

Stocks involved

shareholders of a corporation bringing suit in their individual capacity for a wrong allegedly
done to the corporation by a third party. Id. at 723. The facts involved a timber contract that
the Stocks' corporation, TPI, entered into with a third party to harvest timber on the third
party's land. An employee of an independent logging contractor negligently started a fire and
the third party sought its claimed damages from the Stocks' corporation, TPI, under the
logging contract between them. The Stocks requested that TPI's insurer provide defense and
indemnity for these claims under its insurance contract but the insurer denied coverage based
behalf are not available for one year from the date of dissolution
for use by any other domestic corporation, foreign corporation
transacting business in this state, or person doing business under
an assumed name under Section 42-2-5.
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on a fire exclusion in the policy. The Stocks brought suit claiming damage against the insurer
for its failure to provide insurance coverage. This is because such failure required the Stocks
to fund the litigation with the third party out of their own pockets and also, they claimed
damages for mental and emotional distress allegedly sustained as a result. This Court held on
appeal that a shareholder may not sue as an individual for a wrong done by a third party to
the corporation (citing Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1031-32
(Utah 1979)). [Italicized emphasis added.] Id. at 724.
While Stocks makes clear that a shareholder may not sue—as an individual or in an
individual capacity—for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation, a director or
shareholder can nonetheless sue in the name, or in behalf, of the corporation, as this is
essentially what a Rule 23.1 derivative action is.15 Bio-Thrust has standing on its own to
make claims against an oppressive and mistaken governmental authority that has wrongfully
and unlawfully dissolved it. Bio-Thrust doesn't need Coombs in his capacity as a director or
shareholder to make such claims. This is the point of a Rule 23.1, Utah R. Civ. Pro.,
derivative action: once the directors of a corporation take action to protect the interests of all
the shareholders, the shareholders don't need to assert a derivative action on the corporation's
behalf and in the corporation's name. Thus, if Bio-Thrust is unable or otherwise doesn't have
15

The lower court has thus raised the old "class action vs. derivative action" standing
issue. For example, a shareholder who has been directly injured has standing to bring a Rule
23 class action; a shareholder who has been indirectly injured as a result of injury sustained
by the corporation can have standing to bring a Rule 23.1 derivative action on behalf of
himself and other shareholders, all for the benefit of the corporation, but only when the
corporation's officers and directors refuse to address the alleged injury to the corporation.
Other than his individually-based § 1983 causes of action, this is exactly what Coombs is
doing here.
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standing to complain about its unlawful dissolution, Coombs necessarily does under Rule 23.1
principles. Accordingly, if the lower court is correct in concluding that Bio-Thrust has no
standing to challenge its dissolution or capital punishment because it is dissolved, Coombs
necessarily has standing as a shareholder and director to challenge its capital punishment and
bring the Petition/Complaint in Bio-Thrust's name and on its behalf.16 East Jordan Irrigation
Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993) (a shareholder in a mutual water corporation did
not have standing to change its point of diversion absent the consent of the corporation). In
other words, the lower court can't have it both ways, thereby holding that nobody on earth has
standing to redress the wrongs complained of.17
Stocks, at 724, also carves out an exception, which is applicable here:
. . . this court has recognized a narrow exception to the general
rule regarding a shareholder's capacity to bring an individual
suit. A shareholder may "bring an individual cause of action if
the harm to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an
individual rather than as a shareholder." DLB Collection Trust
v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This
exception applies to cases in which the wrong itself is a
"violation of a duty arising from a contract or otherwise, and
owed directly to the shareholder."

Significantly, language in Holman, supra supports this proposition. At 897, this very
Court stated: "Under Utah law in effect at the time these cases arose, a corporation, its
directors, officers or shareholders could pursue legal remedies 'for any right or claim existing
. . . prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding is commenced within two years
after the date of such dissolution." [Emphasis in italics added.] In other words, this Court
has recognized that a director, officer or shareholder has standing to sue in a corporation's
name or on its behalf, even after it has been dissolved.
17

The lower court seems to have failed to recognize that, assuming that Bio-Thrust had
standing, Coombs's individual standing wouldn't be necessary to or for those causes of action
in the Petition/Complaint in which Bio-Thrust is a plaintiff, i.e., all claims other than the
§ 1983 causes of action.
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Coombs has been damaged, individually, by the Division's failure to follow the law.
This failure is a breach of duty on the part of government owed directly to shareholders and
not by or through a contract, for example, that the corporation, Bio-Thrust, was involved in
with the Division or anyone else, the breach of which damaged it only. Lochhead v. Alacano,
697 F. Supp. 406, ['88-'89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f 94,130 at pp.
91,341-344 (DC Utah 1988) (J. Anderson) (holding that diluting the value of a shareholder's
ownership interest in the corporation is a direct injury and therefore the shareholder had the
right to bring a direct action, not a derivative action). Accordingly, Coombs has individual
standing to assert those claims that the lower court prohibited Bio-Thrust from asserting itself
on its own behalf. Further, he has standing to assert his individual § 1983 claims.
Putting aside the previous points, both Bio-Thrust and Coombs have standing as a
matter of right based on § 5(1 )(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),
specifically, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-5(l)(a), titled Judicial review—Informal adjudicative
proceedings. To be sure, that Bio-Thrust and Coombs have standing to bring this very action
is what the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce plainly held in his March 19,
2002, Agency Order on Review, a copy of which is attached to the Bio-Thrust and Coombs's
Petition/Complaint as Ex. "C"; Addendum 2.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND PREJUDICED BIO-THRUST AND
COOMBS BY NOT ALLOWING THEM TO CONDUCT ANY
DISCOVERY, PARTICULARLY ON THE ISSUE OF HOW AND
UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE DIVISION HAS HISTORICALLY
AND CONSISTENTLY ALLOWED OTHER DISSOLVED
CORPORATIONS TO REINSTATE THEMSELVES
The record is clear and Bio-Thrust and Coombs have repeatedly alleged that the
Division and the Attorney General have not been the least consistent in the manner in which
they have historically allowed dissolved corporations to be both administratively and judicially
reinstated. The lower court should have allowed discovery on this issue and yet it has acted
to prevent such. This denial has prejudiced Bio-Thrust and Coombs because if such were
discovered, it would be revealed how arbitrarily, capriciously, defectively and inconsistently
the Division had administered the statute. Further, Bio-Thrust and Coombs would be enabled
to perfect and legitimize an equal protection or other equitable claim with hard facts and
examples. At the very minimum and if this Court does nothing else, it should reverse the
lower court and allow Bio-Thrust and Coombs to conduct discovery on this issue.
CONCLUSION
It would be a burlesque upon justice not to allow Bio-Thrust to be reinstated under the
facts and circumstances presented. The Division produced no admissible evidence under Rule
56 to resist or defeat Bio-Thrust and Coombs's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. While
the Division may not be required under the dissolution statute to keep all records of all of its
doings, it should at least keep records showing that it complied with the law. It this case there
is no evidence that Bio-Thrust was dissolved properly and lawfully. This is not to ignore that
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an administrative agency is obligated to follow the law, not make it up as it goes along. An
administrative agency is also obligated to treat all those persons it regulates
equally—something the Division has not done since the dissolution statute was modified in
1985 to permanently dissolve corporations. No basis exists NOT to reinstate Bio-Thrust. No
basis exists not to reverse and overrule the lower court and order it to reinstate Bio-Thrust.
DATED this 2 3 day of December, 2002.
Respectfully submitted,
MAB^Y & COOMBS, L.C.
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ADDENDUM 1

